Using several case studies and data from the Economic Freedom of the World annual report and from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, we estimate the effect of human rights abuses on economic liberalization. The data suggest that human rights abuses reduce rather than accelerate the pace of economic liberalization.
Introduction
What Andrei Shleifer (2009) calls "The Age of Milton Friedman" was accompanied by increasing economic freedom in countries around the world. Shleifer notes that since 1980, the world has grown freer, richer, healthier, more educated, and more democratic while enjoying lower taxation and lower inflation. Some of the transitions that have enabled these changes, like the one that took place under the brutal military junta led by Augusto Pinochet in Chile, were also marred by systematic abuses of human rights. Do crises lead to economic liberalization? Do human rights abuses increase or decrease the pace of economic liberalization? In other words, are countries where human rights are abused and where people are tortured, disappear, or are denied rights to movement, speech, and religion likely to see increases or decreases in economic freedom? Case studies of Chile, China, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the United States suggest that crises and human rights abuses generally reduce the pace of economic liberalization.
Using data on human rights violations and economic freedom, we show that between 1980 and today, torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and other violations of human rights are associated with slower rather than faster economic liberalization.
In a provocative 2007 polemic entitled The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster
Capitalism, Naomi Klein argues that economic liberalization is aided and abetted by human rights abuses. The villains in her story are Milton Friedman and the Chicago School economists, and she lays a legacy of human rights violations, torture, corruption, and ideology-fueled blindness and callousness at their feet. Klein argues that since free-market economic reforms are democratically unpopular, capitalist change requires disasters, crises, social upheavals, and human rights violations in order to create the conditions in which these unpopular policies can be foisted upon the polity. To drive this point home, Klein's index entry for "Friedman, Milton" includes a passage on "his responsibility for human rights violations suggested," that refers the reader to pages 73, 99, 116-18, 191, and 273 . She explicitly ties economic liberalization to torture suggesting that torture is necessary for the imposition of "economic shock therapy" in the face of resistance (Klein 2007:25-26 ) and tries to connect the horrific abuses that occurred during CIA experiments with electroshock therapy and Friedman's economic policy prescriptions (Klein 2007:25-71) . Torture is not something to be taken lightly, and the implications of Klein's thesis, particularly for the intellectual legacy of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of economics, are severe. Shleifer (2009) describes the Chicago School's prescription as a program of macroeconomic stability, openness to international trade, and well-specified, well-enforced private property rights. The political problem is that policies promoting secure private property rights, markets, and monetary stability are often unpopular, upsetting to the ruling elites, and very difficult to implement. Accordingly, adoption of reforms, whether they are liberal or illiberal, is perhaps most likely during a period of upheaval in which the political coalitions and rent-seeking interest groups that forestall economic change are shaken up.
Our purpose here is not to review The Shock Doctrine; we refer the reader to Cowen (2007) , Norberg (2008) , and Carden (2009) for critical reviews. The relationship between crisis and institutional change as such is well documented.
1 We seek to isolate one of the The Shock Doctrine's claims that lends itself to empirical testing and that has broader implications for our understanding of the institutional foundations of prosperity. The literature on the institutional foundations of poverty and prosperity is growing, and we focus on determinants of institutional change. Specifically, we explore the empirical relationship between human rights abuses and changes in economic freedom. The data suggest that liberal economic reforms occur more readily in countries with better human rights records, and human rights abuses reduce the pace of economic liberalization.
Institutions, Economic Freedom, and Development
A number of recent contributions highlight the importance of institutions as determinants of economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2001 (Acemoglu et al. , 2004 Rodrik et al. 2004; North 2005; North et al. 2009 ). Institutions are formal rules, informal norms, and their enforcement characteristics that define the rules of the economic game (North 2005:48) . The importance of institutions is wellunderstood. The factors that generate institutional change are more poorly understood, though crises like wars and natural disasters are important sources of institutional change. They upset and in some cases destroy the rent-seeking coalitions that cause economic sclerosis (Olson 1965) . In some cases, countries liberalize. In other cases, states take greater control over the private economy.
The state's tendency to broaden its discretion in times of crisis is explored in the American context by Robert Higgs (1987) , who argued that the disastrous conditions during the World Wars and the Great Depression contributed to a "ratchet effect" whereby the United States government expanded its discretion over Americans' day-to-day affairs. The mechanism leads to permanent changes in government authority by increasing state discretion during the crisis.
Post-crisis, the new range of authority creates new rent-seeking coalitions and interest groups that actively resist reversion to the pre-crisis status quo. After the dust settles, the state is larger and more powerful than it was before.
Ideological change is central to Higgs's thesis. In times of disaster, people reflexively turn to government for answers. Caplan (2007:170) points out that in the wake of one of the most conspicuous government failures in history-the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001-the public's faith in government to "do the right thing" increased substantially. Ideological change of this type has two effects. First, it allows for the expansion of government authority as new programs which normally would have been opposed are now sanctioned by the polity.
Second, it allows the unscrupulous and the opportunistic to slide damaging political favors past a newly-credulous public.
Almost without exception, the empirical evidence favors the view that economic freedom is consistent with better economic and human development. There are many empirical uncertainties as scholars consider difficult issues associated with causality and endogeneity, but the correlations are undeniably positive. The most widely studied area is the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth. De Haan et al. (2007:157) survey many published articles on economic freedom and growth and conclude that "there are strong indications that liberalization, i.e. an increase in the EF index, stimulates economic growth." Blume and Voigt (2007) show that respect for human rights is associated with faster GDP growth per capita, more rapid capital accumulation, and higher total factor productivity.
Others show positive associations between economic liberalism and other measures of human development. For example, Gerring and Thacker (2008) find that liberal policies like trade openness, inflation fighting, and private property rights are associated with lower infant mortality through channels independent of their effects on economic variables. Eriksen and de Soysa (2009:485) find that "a proxy for neo-liberal policies, the index of economic freedom, correlates strongly with better human rights." Aixalá and Fabro (2009: 177) Gartzke (2007) and Hall and Lawson (2009) .
These studies use measures of capitalism, or economic freedom, as an independent variable to explain some other dependent variable (like growth, infant mortality, etc.). However, a careful reading of The Shock Doctrine places human rights violations as an independent causal predictor for economic liberalization.
Measuring "human rights" is tricky, but progress has been made along these lines. In a discussion of international human rights conventions, McGinnis (1999 McGinnis ( :1029 points out that international human rights conventions posit rights to paid holidays but no rights to economic freedoms such as "a right to compensation for takings of property or…protection for other individual freedoms, such as the right to contract…" He claims that economic freedoms should be integral to the international human rights agenda. Powell (2006) points out that what look like victories for human rights-such as restrictions (voluntary or otherwise) on "sweatshops"-are not necessarily victories because workers in low-productivity countries are willing to trade workplace safety and comfort for higher wages.
Case Studies
Crises effect institutional change. Chicago economist Arnold Harberger (1998:3) points out that "(m)oments of crisis open up opportunities, both for good and for ill, because people are more willing to make sacrifices and take risks in the hope of surmounting the crisis." This is not a statement of strategy but an empirical statement about a sad, unfortunate, and non-controversial reality. Friedman himself is quoted by Yergin and Stanislaw (1998:149) as saying that "(t)he role of people is to keep ideas alive until a crisis occurs." The data on economic freedom give us the opportunity to apply more rigorous standards to the hypothesis that disaster and human rights abuses lead to human rights abuses. Harberger, not Friedman (Friedman and Friedman 1998:397) .
Friedman taught the introductory economic theory course for graduate students, and there were a number of students from Chile who participated in Friedman's money and banking workshop (Friedman and Friedman 1998:397) . He never "acted as an adviser to the Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet" as Klein claims (Klein 2007:7) . Friedman met with
Pinochet for 45 minutes while he was giving private lectures in Chile in 1975 at the behest of a private foundation and wrote a single letter "arguing for a plan to end hyperinflation and liberalize the economy" (Norberg 2008:3) . Friedman went to great lengths to distance himself from Pinochet, condemning his human rights abuses in public and refusing "two honorary degrees from Chilean universities that received government funding because he thought it could be interpreted as a support for the regime" (Norberg 2008:3) .
In 1970, the Marxist Salvador Allende was elected to the Chilean presidency. But just barely: Allende won 36.8% of the vote and after some political wrangling was selected by the legislature to be president of the country. This thrilled officials in the Soviet Union because, for the first time, a Marxist government had come to power through politically legitimate means (Friedman and Friedman 1998:397-398) . Allende and Unidad Popular ran against monopoly, dependency, oligarchy ,and capitalism, and their movement was specifically Marxian, aimed at "replac(ing) the capitalist system with socialism" (Larrain and Meller, 1991:179-180, 175) .
Allende took over and set about destroying "a highly urbanized, industrial economy" by focusing his attention on redistribution (Cardoso and Helwege 1991:52-53) . He ran a fiscal deficit of approximately forty percent of GNP; this could only be financed through inflation (Pineiro 2009 ). There was another large leap in economic freedom between 1990 and 1995 after Pinochet ceded power to a democratically-elected government. This increase was both absolute and relative: Chile's Economic Freedom score increased from 6.93 to 7.48, and they went from being the 24th freest of 113 countries on which data were collected to being the 14th freest out of 123. To put it briefly, the violation of human rights, the system of institutionalized brutality, the drastic control and suppression of every form of meaningful dissent is discussed (and often condemned) as a phenomenon only indirectly linked, or indeed entirely unrelated, to the classical unrestricted 'free market' policies that have been enforced by the military junta. This failure to connect has been particularly characteristic of private and public financial institutions, which have publicly praised and supported the economic policies adopted by the Pinochet government, while regretting the 'bad international image' the junta has gained from its 'incomprehensible' persistence in torturing, jailing, and persecuting all its critics (Letelier 1976:137) .
In a 1982 Newsweek column, Friedman disputed the myth that political authoritarianism was necessary for economic liberalization, calling the Chilean experience "an exception, not the rule"
and arguing that the free market he espoused was the opposite of the military hierarchy as practiced by the Chilean junta. He went on to argue that free-market policies were not likely to persist unless the junta gave way to political liberty (Friedman and Friedman 1998:407) . This is precisely what happened in Chile as the country liberalized further after Pinochet stepped down.
As Pineiro (2009) program of a free-market ideologue. As more data on economic freedom emerge, we will be better able to evaluate President Bush's institutional legacy.
( Figure 5 Here)
Empirical Analysis
Klein makes claims throughout The Shock Doctrine that lend themselves to empirical analysis. On page 11, she claims that "authoritarian conditions are required for the implementation of its true vision". On page 115, she claims that "...the Chicago School project in Latin America was quite literally built on the secret torture camps where thousands of people who believed in a different country disappeared." She continues on pp. 133-34: "dictatorships--where freedom was markedly absent--were the only governments who were ready to put freemarket doctrine into practice." On page 15, she claims that "(f)rom Chile to China to Iraq, torture has been a silent partner in the global free-market crusade." Norberg (2008:7-8 ) points out several counterexamples of "rapidly-liberalizing democracies like Iceland, Ireland, Estonia, Australia, or the United States during the 1980s, where reforms were given renewed support in several elections." Fortunately, country-level data are available that allow us to examine these claims more rigorously and explore the contribution of human rights violations to economic liberalization. In short, the data can help us determine whether "torture has been a silent partner in the global free-market crusade."
Data
Data from the CIRI Human Rights Project at SUNY-Binghamton and the Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) index allow us to explore the hypothesized link between political repression and economic liberalization in greater detail. Unfortunately, the CIRI data only go back to 1980, which means that they do not cover Pinochet's takeover in Chile or the late 1970s coup in Argentina. These are conspicuous omissions, to be sure, and future attempts to measure human rights abuses should extend the data backward to cover these important episodes.
Second, it is important to note that we do not include "disaster" as a trigger for institutional change; rather, we look for the degree to which changes in human rights practices increase or decrease the pace of economic liberalization based on Klein's empirical claims about human rights abuses being "silent partner(s) in the global free-market crusade." At the margin, according to Klein, torture, disappearances, and other encroachments on human rights should increase the pace of economic liberalization.
The CIRI Human Rights Data Project reports data on extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, political disappearances, freedom of speech and government censorship, freedom of religion, freedom of movement and migration, freedom of assembly and association, political freedoms coded as "electoral self-determination" and freeand-fair elections, workers' rights, political rights for women, economic rights for women, social rights for women, and several aggregated indices called the Physical Integrity Rights Index and the Empowerment Rights Index. In every case, the data are coded such that a higher number indicates greater respect for human rights. In the case of the torture variable, for example, a country is coded with a zero if torture is used frequently, a one if torture is sometimes used, and a two if torture is never used.
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Of particular interest are estimates of frequency with which regimes use torture. Again, these data only go back to 1980 and therefore cannot tell us about the specific transformations that occurred in Latin America in the 1970s. Nevertheless, they allow us to estimate long panels involving countries from around the globe in order to determine if human rights abuses increase or decrease the pace of economic liberalization.
The measure we use for economic liberalism is the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index by Gwartney and Lawson (2008) . 6 The EFW index is designed to measure the consistency of a jurisdiction's institutions and policies with economic freedom. In order to achieve a high rating, a jurisdiction must provide secure protection of privately owned property, evenhanded enforcement of contracts, and a stable monetary environment. It also must keep taxes low, refrain from creating barriers to both domestic and international trade, and rely more fully on markets rather than the political process to allocate goods and resources.
The index measures the degree of economic freedom present in five major areas; (1 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 , yielding over 600 observations. 7 Descriptive
Statistics are found in Table 1 . The next section discusses the empirical relationship between human rights violations and economic liberalization.
Regression Analysis
Equation (1) gives our model:
X is a vector of control variables to include region and time fixed effects. Note that by including the lagged value of the dependent variable, this specification isolates changes in the level of economic freedom. In addition, using the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable should dramatically reduce the impact of any omitted variable bias in our admittedly parsimonious specification. This model can examine a plausible alternative hypothesis: human rights abuses reduce the pace of economic liberalization, as Norberg (2008) argued.
Regression results are reported in Table 2 . We control for the previous period's economic freedom, the country's region, and the year. 8 The bottom line is that improved human rights were statistically significantly linked with increased economic liberalization in 12 of the 14 regressions. The remaining two cases has the same sign but were statistically insignificant.
Conversely, human rights abuses were associated with a slower pace of economic liberalization.
The magnitude of the coefficients indicate that a one unit increase in the 0-1-2 coded human rights variables yield between a 0.11-0.18 unit increase in the EFW index. The largest coefficient magnitudes were for Torture and Disappearances, the two concepts specifically highlighted by Klein. Though statistically different from zero, we emphasize that these impacts are not particularly large. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that human rights abuses are not "silent partner(s) in the global free-market crusade."
The effect Klein posits is likely a function of regional fixed effects, which suggests that Klein is perhaps conflating regional idiosyncrasies with a systematic effect of human rights abuses on economic liberalization. Human rights abuses walk hand-in-hand with tyranny of all kinds, and the evidence suggest that Friedman was correct. Tyrannical regimes like Pinochet's
Chile that adopt liberal institutions and increase economic freedom are the exception rather than the rule (Friedman and Friedman 1998:407) .
Conclusions and Further Directions
Our estimates consider the relationship between human rights violations and economic liberalization very broadly. However, the Economic Freedom of the World Index is comprised of a number of measures of economic freedom, each of which can be explored in isolation.
Furthermore, we have not addressed the relationship between human rights violations and Foreign Direct Investment; part of Klein's "disaster capitalism" thesis is that human rights violations quell popular resistance to globalization. The estimates in this paper suggest that human rights violations cause economic freedom to retreat rather than advance, but many questions remain to be answered.
Studies of economic freedom suggest that economic freedom increases economic growth, and these results suggest that human rights abuses reduce rather than increase the pace at which countries adopt liberal economic institutions. In The Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein when it comes to the unintended consequences of their policies" (Klein 2007:278) . The unintended consequences she purports to identify are not, in fact, there. 
